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Abstract: Most terrorism is carried out by organizations with particular political 
motivations, mobilization issues, and other characteristics that affect their behavior, 
including their attacks. Group dynamics are often overlooked when research focuses on 
units of analysis such as countries or individuals. However, understanding the 
organizational dynamics of terrorism can shed light on this type of violence in important 
ways. This chapter begins by discussing definitions of key concepts, and then analyzes 
recent literature on several prominent topics: outbidding, internal group dynamics, and 
organizational longevity or failure. It concludes by noting potential avenues for future 
research, including more work on strategic interactions between terrorist organizations and 
states, as well as increased dialogue with research on related topics such as civil conflict.   
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There are many approaches one can use to understand terrorism, including the study 
of individual terrorists, broad social movements, or countries where terrorists operate. 
However, analyzing organizations provides important leverage. Most terrorist attacks are 
carried out by formal organizations, and therefore most attacks are by groups with 
particular political goals, mobilization issues, structure, internal strain, and other 
characteristics. Understanding these dynamics can illuminate a great deal about the 
phenomenon of terrorism. 
The organizational focus of terrorism studies is not new. In the 1980s, scholars 
presented important theoretical work on organizational dynamics of terrorism (e.g., 
Crenshaw, 1985, 1987; Oots, 1989; Post, 1987). An early study of democracy and terrorism 
used the number of terrorist groups in a country as the outcome of interest (Eubank and 
Weinberg, 1994). Case studies of terrorist groups have always been important topic in the 
field (Crenshaw, 1995; Rapoport, 2001). A less common, although often powerful 
approach, is formal theory (Bapat, 2012; Lapan and Sandler, 1988). A substantial 
development occurred around 2008, with the publication of several global data sets of 
terrorist organizations (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008, Cronin, 2009; Jones and Libicki, 
2008). This has permitted scholars to explore global trends in terrorist group behavior, 
using the same quantitative approaches already used to study terrorism – although usually 
with the country or country-year as unit of analysis (Li, 2005).1        
 Policy-motivated debates raise questions about which level of analysis is “best,” as 
scholars discuss which actors pose greater threats. Formal terrorist organizations have 
received the most policy and scholarly attention—and for good reason. Formal groups 
                                                        
1 Silke (e.g., 2001) noticed that terrorism studies was unusual in the social sciences for 
rarely using interferential or even descriptive statistics. 
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directly carry out the vast majority of terrorist attacks, and attacks by these groups are 
usually far more lethal than attacks by lone actors (Alakoc, 2015; Phillips, 2015d). 
Historically, organizations like the Red Brigades and the Shining Path terrorized 
populations, and groups such as al-Nusra Front and Boko Haram carry on the tradition.        
But some analysts argue that informal networks, or “bunches of guys,” are the dominant 
security challenge—not formal organizations (Sageman, 2008). Because al Qaeda has been 
weakened since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, Sageman argues that small groups of 
individuals inspired by the group are more of a threat than the organization itself. Others 
maintain that lone wolf attacks are especially threatening, citing the increasing number of 
such attacks in Western countries (Michael, 2012).    
 The next section discusses the definition of terrorist organization. Then, the essay 
explores recent lines of research on organizational dynamics of terrorism, including 
outbidding, internal group dynamics, and organizational termination and longevity. The 
chapter concludes with suggestions for future research. A caveat is that this chapter cannot 
discuss every article or book written about terrorist groups. It seeks to discuss a few key 
lines of research, and in doing so shed light on a powerful approach to understanding 
terrorism.    
 
What is a terrorist organization? 
Terrorism is often defined as violence by subnational actors to obtain a political or 
social objective through the intimidation of an audience beyond the noncombatant victims 
(Enders and Sandler 2012, 4). The definition is of course debated, but many authors agree 
on core elements. However, there has been little discussion of what constitutes a “terrorist 
organization,” despite the common use of the term. About 15 years before this chapter was 
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written, two separate analyses noted that there was no clear definition of “terrorist 
organization” (McCormick 2003, 47; Silke, 2001, 3). Debating the nature of the concept is 
important for clarity and consistency in research. Additionally, the effects of government 
strategies are likely to be conditional upon the nature of the targeted group. This is what 
Cronin (2015) argues in an article titled, in part, “ISIS is not a terrorist group.” Differences 
across group types help explain why leadership decapitation has distinct consequences 
depending on whether the targeted group is a terrorist or criminal organization (Phillips, 
2015b). 
 One conceptual dispute involves the distinction between terrorist and guerrilla 
groups. De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca (2011) argue that terrorist groups are 
“underground groups with no territorial control,” while guerrilla groups occupy territory. 
The FARC and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula would not be considered terrorist groups 
by this standard, as they control territory. This notion is consistent with some scholars’ 
definitions (Della Porta, 1995; Cronin, 2015). However, other studies use a broader 
understanding of terrorist organizations that includes any subnational political 
organizations that use terrorism (Asal, 2012; Jones and Libicki, 2008;). Some research does 
not explicitly define the term, but includes organizations that hold territory or use guerrilla 
tactics in analyses (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008, Enders and Sandler, 2012). Others use the 
terms interchangeably; Hoffman (2006, 35) describes Hezbollah, the FARC, and the LTTE 
as terrorist groups, but notes that they “are also often described as guerrilla movements.” 
 An additional issue of contention involves blurred lines between criminal 
organizations and terrorist groups. For example, Shelley (2014, 113) argues that some 
scholars have been constrained by a “false dichotomy” of criminal groups driven by profit, 
and terrorists driven by political motivations. This is consistent with work suggesting 
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convergence or hybridization of criminal and terrorist groups (Makarenko, 2004). 
Regarding specific cases, there are debates about whether various groups are terrorist or 
criminal organizations. Examples include Mexican drug cartels, the Neapolitan Camorra, 
the FARC, and Abu Sayyaf (Flanigan, 2012; Makarenko, 2004; Toros and Mavelli 2013; 
Williams, 2012)—all of whom are have engaged in some degree of criminal activity while 
using terrorist tactics.  
 In spite of these debates, most studies of terrorist organizations use the term in a 
fairly consistent manner. After a survey of the literature, I found that most studies implicitly 
or explicitly used the following understanding of terrorist groups: subnational political 
organizations that use terrorism (Phillips 2015c, 229). They are subnational actors, although 
they might have connections to states. They are primarily political organizations, meaning 
that while groups such as the FARC and Abu Sayyaf also engage in crime, it does not seem 
to be their primary purpose. Groups that primarily engage in crime and only affect politics 
to increase their profits, such as Mexican drug cartels and Italian mafias, are thus not 
considered terrorist groups. This is the definition employed in this chapter. As with any 
concept, the appropriate conceptual boundaries likely depend on one’s research question. 
For some purposes, it could make sense to exclude groups that primarily use other tactics, 
such as guerrilla warfare. Debate continues over this topic, and debate is better than the 
relative silence that existed for many years.  
 
Recent research on terrorist organizations 
 
 Outbidding and competition 
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 It has been noted that terrorism studies suffers from some shortcomings as a 
theoretical field, such as insufficient accumulation of knowledge over time, or a lack of 
rigorous hypothesis testing (e.g., Crenshaw, 2014; Young and Findley, 2011; Ranstorp, 
2006). One important exception to both of these issues, I would argue, involves the subject 
of outbidding. “Outbidding” generally refers to elites taking increasingly extreme positions 
(Sartori 1962), and it is usually used to describe ethnic or nationalist party politics (e.g., 
Chandra 2005; Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972, 151).2 In conflict studies, 
however, it has come to mean militant groups engaging in increasingly violent tactics to 
distinguish themselves from others. 
Mia Bloom (2004, 2005) introduced outbidding to terrorism studies to explain 
suicide terror, joining a lively debate on the subject (Atran, 2003; Crenshaw 2007; 
Moghadam, 2003; Pape, 2003; Pedazhur, 2005). Bloom argues that suicide terrorism is a 
tactical innovation that occurs when militant groups are competing for public support, and 
looking for ways to stand out. Whether groups turn to, and continue to use, suicide terror 
depends on whether they think the public will accept or reject the tactic's use (Bloom 
2005). 
 The idea of outbidding as violence apparently has been useful to students of 
terrorism, because Bloom’s article and book together have been cited more than 1,000 
times. In addition to suicide terror, outbidding has been applied to other violent outcomes 
as well. Scholars have explored how outbidding can lead to more terrorism (Nemeth 2013), 
new terrorist groups (Chenoweth 2010), and more “severe” attacks such as targeting 
                                                        
2 Kaufman (1996, 109) argues that endogenous processes of outbidding, mass ethnic 
hostility, and security dilemma could spiral into ethnic war. However, like previous 
authors, he describes outbidding as increasingly extreme nationalist positions. After Bloom, 
other scholars describe outbidding as escalating levels of violence (e.g., Nemeth 2013). 
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civilians more than government targets (Conrad and Greene 2015). More generally, Kydd 
and Walter (2006) argue that outbidding is one of the principal strategies of terrorism. 
 Beyond terrorism studies, scholars of civil war often draw on outbidding and cite 
Bloom’s work as they study spoiler processes, group fragmentation, and other dynamics of 
civil conflict (Bakke, Cunningham and Seymour, 2012; Fortna, 2015; Pearlman, 2009; 
Stanton 2013). The concept of outbidding seems to be one of the rare cases of a concept 
popularized in the terrorism literature catching on in other fields.   
 Scholars continue to test the outbidding hypothesis and related arguments, building 
on the work of those before them. Some studies find mixed or little support for the idea that 
competition between groups leads to suicide terror, or more terrorism (Brym and Araj, 
2008; Findley and Young, 2012; Fortna, 2015; Stanton, 2013). Other results are more 
consistent with the outbidding hypothesis (e.g., Chenoweth, 2010). Nemeth (2013) finds 
that the impact of competition is conditional on group ideology: competition is associated 
with more violence among nationalist and religious groups, but less violence among leftist 
groups.   
Studies increasingly use the outbidding hypothesis to explain outcomes beyond 
terrorism rates, and have found results consistent with the argument. Chenoweth (2010) 
finds competition not only associated with increased terrorism, but also the emergence of 
new terrorist groups. Conrad and Greene (2015) show that competition leads to more 
shocking kinds of terrorism, such as attacking civilian instead of government targets. 
Competition can encourage groups to innovate and eventually survive longer than they 
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otherwise would have (Phillips, 2015a).3 Competition is especially associated with group 
longevity for the “top dog” group in a country (Young and Dugan, 2014). 
 Research on outbidding is likely to continue, as important questions remain. The 
effects of competition seem to be conditional on other factors. Findley and Young (2012) 
note that competition leads to suicide bombing in some countries, but not others. Part of the 
explanation could be that the group’s political goals play a role (Nemeth 2013). Useful new 
directions for research include questions such as: (1) What other factors condition the 
effects of outbidding? (2) Beyond outcomes discussed above, what are other consequences 
of outbidding? (3) Aside from outbidding as an independent variable, what explains 
outbidding? (4) Is outbidding being measured adequately? Quantitative studies often 
capture outbidding simply with the presence of multiple terrorist groups in a geographic 
area. However, future research could use more precise measures. 
  
Internal dynamics 
 A growing number of studies look comparatively at internal dynamics of terrorist 
organizations, as opposed to treating groups as unitary actors. Some of this research 
examines organizational structure, considering tradeoffs between loose networks and more 
hierarchical organizations.  Other work in looks at group mobilization issues, such as 
recruiting and fundraising.  
Terrorist groups vary substantially in their internal organizational structure, and this 
can have important implications for group behavior. It has been argued that the network 
structure – loosely-connected cells instead of a hierarchical chain of command – is 
                                                        
3 On groups innovating because of interactions with the government, instead of other 
terrorist groups, see Kenney (2007). 
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increasingly common for terrorists (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001; Sageman, 2004). As a 
result, a wave of research looking at so-called “dark networks” has applied social network 
analysis to individual terrorists (Carley, 2006; Everton, 2012; Raab and Milward, 2003).4 
One criticism of this line of work is that focusing on networks of individual terrorists, 
independently of formal group membership, overlooks the importance of formal 
organizations and organizational processes (e.g., Helfstein, 2009). Indeed, this was the 
source of a debate between two prominent terrorism scholars, regarding the nature of the al 
Qaeda threat (Sageman and Hoffman, 2008). 
 Many scholars are also using network or organizational studies approaches to 
understand dynamics within formal terrorist organizations. Understanding the structure of 
terrorist organizations contributes to our knowledge of group leadership, communication, 
and other dynamics (Horgan and Taylor, 1997). Some scholars consider tradeoffs between 
the more decentralized cell-based structures and more hierarchical structures (Enders and 
Su, 2007, Helfstein and Wright, 2011a, 2011b; Pearson et al., 2015). There is said to be a 
security-effectiveness tradeoff across group types, where centralized groups are more 
effective with their violence, but less secure from counterterrorism efforts(Kilberg 2009, 
2012). Accordingly, several studies find that hierarchical terrorist groups are more lethal 
(Heger, Jung, and Wong, 2012; Helfstein and Wright 2011b; Rowlands and Kilberg, 
2009).5 In spite of benefits of hierarchy, groups seem to be aware of the security-
                                                        
4 The term “dark networks” is principally used by public administration scholars, to 
indicate that they are studying covert networks, as opposed to legal organizations such as 
government agencies. Scholars from other disciplines use network analysis for terrorists as 
well, but often without using the term “dark networks” (e.g., Krebs 2002; Perliger and 
Pedahzur, 2011). 
5 A somewhat related finding is that hierarchical state-sponsored militant groups are more 
likely to remain obedient to their sponsor, while decentralized groups are prone to break 
their commitment to their sponsoring state and attack it (Popovic 2015). 
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effectiveness tradeoff, as they are less likely to take a hierarchical form in states with better 
counterterrorism capacities (Kilberg 2012, 821). 
 Beyond the question of consequences of organizational structure, there are 
opportunities for additional research on related topics. Abrahms and Potter (2015) find that 
leadership deficits are associated with militant groups attacking civilians. How else do 
leadership types or issues affect group behavior? McCormick (2003) noted that there are a 
broad variety of terrorist decision-making processes, and that extant theoretical frameworks 
can be harnessed to help us better understand terrorist decision-making – but few scholars 
have taken up this challenge. Why do some groups adopt certain decision-making styles, 
and what are the effects of these decisions? How might internal structures of terrorist 
groups affect, for example, their relationships with states, including negotiation outcomes?  
Mobilization, in terms of obtaining and keeping resources (such as personnel and 
funds), is crucial for terrorist organizations. Regarding membership, Shapiro (2013) argues 
that terrorist organization leaders face a fundamental challenge in trying to control their 
members while maintaining secrecy, in what he calls “the terrorist’s dilemma.” The issue of 
how terrorist groups find and keep recruits is an important one (Crenshaw, 1987, Della 
Porta, 1995, 2014). More recently, scholars have sought to understand why “ foreign 
fighters” join groups in countries other than their own. Hegghammer (2011) explores the 
motivations of Muslim foreign fighters, and argues that their roots are in 1970s pan-Islamic 
thought, brought about by elite competition. He also finds that Western jihadists seem to 
prefer to join groups in foreign countries, and rarely return to attack in their home country 
(Hegghammer 2013). Once abroad, these foreign fighters play key roles in terrorist groups, 
such as media specialists or recruiters (Mendelsohn, 2011).  
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Another mobilization topic is female participation in terrorist organizations. Some 
studies seek to explain why groups try to recruit women, emphasizing issues such the 
tendency of security forces to overlook women as suspects (Cunningham 2003). Gonzalez-
Perez (2006, 2008) notes differences in female participation rates between domestic and 
international groups, and argues that domestic groups are especially likely to accept 
women, and women are relatively interested in joining these groups, given that these 
organizations often address perceived oppression in their own country. International 
organizations, on the other hand, are less likely to recruit women for more than menial 
roles.6 Other research focuses on what draws women to terrorist groups. Bloom (2011) 
argues that revenge is one of the important factors. Less studied have been the 
consequences of female participation in terrorist groups. How does higher female 
participation affect group behavior? Are these groups more tactically or strategically 
effective than relatively homogenous groups?  
There is space for more research on terrorist group recruiting and retention 
strategies. For example, we know that group size – in terms of members – is one of the 
most important factors in explaining organizational lethality, civilian targeting, and 
endurance (Asal and Rethemeyer, 2008; Asal et al., 2009; Asal et a. 2015; Gaibulloev and 
Sandler, 2014; Horowitz and Potter 2014). Some studies explore how repression affects 
mobilization (Bueno de Mesquita 2005b). However, we know little about why some types 
groups are better at drawing members than others. 
Funding is also of clear importance for terrorist organizations. While terrorist ttacks 
are famously cheap (e.g., Richardson 2003), the violence nonetheless implies non-trivial 
                                                        
6 Interestingly, neither ideological nor religious orientations are associated with female 
participation, according to one study (Dalton and Asal 2011).  
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expenditures. Groups generally purchase weapons, for example, and many larger groups 
pay their members’ salaries and even provide social services for the community they seek 
to represent. These dynamics are important for group discipline and ultimately success 
(Berman, 2011; Shapiro, 2013; Shapiro and Siegel, 2007). 
Many terrorist groups obtain their funds through crime such as drug trafficking 
(Asal, Milward, and Schoon, 2015). This became increasingly common as Cold War-
related funds dried up, and globalization made transnational black markets more feasible 
and lucrative (Shelley, 2014). However, terrorist groups have long used criminal means to 
fund themselves, from kidnapping to bank robberies to drug sales (e.g., Horgan and Taylor, 
1999). Beyond engaging in crimes for fundraising, many terrorist organizations rely on 
donations – with varying degrees of coercion – from the wider community (Boylan 2015). 
A number of questions remain regarding terrorist group funding, including: Why do groups 
choose one funding type over another? What drives shifts from one funding type to 
another? What government policies, such as economic sanctions, have been effective at 
making terrorism funding more challenging? 
 
Group termination 
 Terrorist group termination is one of the most-studied topics of organizational 
dynamics of terrorism in recent years, although the line of research could be more 
theoretically coherent or cumulative. Attention to terrorist group termination makes sense 
given interest in counterterrorism, and because so many groups have come and gone in 
recent decades. The availability of new data sources probably also plays a role. Terrorist 
group termination studies have roots in the late 1980s (Crenshaw, 1987, 1991; Oots, 1989; 
Ross and Gurr, 1989). Crenshaw (1991) applied her earlier work on organizational 
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dynamics to the study of organizational decline, showing that government policies are only 
a small part of why some groups give up terrorism or cease to exist. She analyzed 77 
terrorist groups, and found that groups tended to end through government force, group 
disintegration, or the groups deciding to give up terrorism. Regarding giving up terrorism, 
Weinberg and Pedahzur’s (2003) book explored relationships between terrorist groups and 
political parties, including when terrorists give up violence and become legal parties.7  
Cronin (2006) provided a theoretical framework for group termination in an article, 
outlining seven ways that terrorist groups can end, and applying the typology to analysis of 
al Qaeda. The seven ways terrorist groups end, according to the analysis, are (1) capture or 
killing of the leader, (2) failure to transition to the next generation, (3) achievement of the 
group’s aims, (4) transition to a legitimate political process, (5) undermining of popular 
support, (6) repression, and (7) transition from terrorism to other forms of violence (Cronin 
2006, 17-18). A special issue of Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict looked at how 
criminology research can inform the study of “desistance from terrorism,” analyzing why 
individuals and groups stop using terrorism (LaFree and Miller, 2008).   
Some of the first global quantitative studies on terrorist group demise were made 
possible by the RAND-MIPT data on terrorist organizations. Jones and Libicki’s (2008) 
monograph analyzed 648 groups and reached a number of interesting conclusions, such as 
reporting that only 7% percent of groups that ended did so as a result of military force. 
Cronin’s book (2009), following up on the earlier article, analyzed hundreds of groups, and 
                                                        
7 See also Weinberg (2012). 
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provided rich qualitative evidence of the seven ending types. Both books applied their 
findings to the case of al Qaeda.8  
Both Jones and Libicki and Cronin draw on historical data to note the challenge that 
religious groups are especially durable, but they also express some optimism regarding the 
fact that religious terrorists rarely achieve their political goals. Jones and Libicki’s (2008, 
xvi-xvii) primary conclusion regarding al Qaeda is that military force alone is unlikely to 
defeat the group, so they call for an end to the “war” on terror. They suggest policing and 
intelligence are crucial. Cronin (2009 193-196) also argues for a more nuanced 
counterterrorism approach. She suggests considering negotiations with some peripheral 
elements of al Qaeda to fragment it, undercutting its popular support by pointing out 
contradictions such as the group’s civilian targeting, and avoiding overreaction to its 
terrorist attacks.  
  Scholars continue to use global data, and more sophisticated statistical analysis, to 
explore the question of terrorist group termination, and its flip side, group longevity (e.g., 
Blomberg et al., 2010; Carter, 2012a; Pearson et al., 2015; Suttmoeller et al., 2015). Some 
of the studies seem oriented more toward introducing new independent variables, focusing 
on the effects of single factors such as repression (Daxecker and Hess, 2013), terrorist 
group alliances (Phillips, 2014), or state sponsorship (Carter, 2012a.) Others are more 
broadly oriented, exploring many factors to see which models seem to explain group 
survival best (Blomberg et al., 2011, Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2013). 
 A puzzle regarding terrorist group termination and longevity is that meta-analysis 
suggests that few results are robust across multiple studies (Phillips 2018). Perhaps the 
                                                        
8 Studies tend to focus on especially-durable groups, but a valuable alternative approach is 
looking at short-lived groups to see why they failed to endure (e.g., de Graaf and Malkki 
2010).  
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most consistent result is that groups with larger memberships are more likely to survive 
(e.g., Blomberg et al., 2011; Jones and Libicki, 2008; Phillips 2014). This is probably not 
surprising, but raises questions about what explains membership size. Several studies also 
find that intergroup relationships, cooperation and competition, are associated with group 
duration (Gaibulloev and Sandler 2013, Price 2012, Phillips 2014, Phillips 2015a). Two 
state variables, country population and poverty, are also often related to group longevity. 
Population is usually included as a control variable but has not been explored in depth as a 
substantively and theoretically-important factor. Regarding poverty, is likely that poorer 
countries do not have the resources to successfully eliminate groups, and that there are 
grievances present that help groups recruit.   
Other theoretically relevant factors – the regime type of the country in which a 
group operates, or whether the group is motivated by religion or nationalism – are not 
consistently associated with group survival. These inconsistent findings suggest scholars 
need to think more about factors that should affect groups, instead of only relying on 
traditional determinants of terrorism generally.  
 One way research on group termination could advance would be to focus on 
particular ending types, instead of assuming the factors that explain one ending type also 
explain another. The few studies to look at determinants of diverse ending types have found 
quite different results for each form of termination (Carter, 2012a, Gaibulloev and Sandler, 
2014). Future research could benefit from picking one theoretically interesting type of 
group termination, such as elimination by the government or internal dissolution, and try to 
narrow down factors that robustly explain it. Additionally, beyond searching for a general 
explanation of terrorist group survival (or a particular termination type), scholars could 
simply use survival analysis as one type of outcome of interest for various questions about 
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terrorist groups. For example, to explore consequences of leadership decapitation, group 
survival is a relevant dependent variable (Price, 2012). 
 
New directions 
This chapter has outlined a number of potential avenues for future research, such as 
analyzing outbidding with more nuance, bringing coherence to the study of terrorist group 
termination, and more empirical work on terrorist group funding. Here I review a few areas 
of organizational dynamics of terrorism that also deserve additional focus. 
 Because of space reasons, this chapter did not include much discussion of another 
aspect of organizational dynamics – groups’ relationships with the state. This topic is 
arguably less “organizational,” in that not all of it incorporates specific internal dynamics 
such as mobilization. However, some of the relevant work includes analysis of negotiations 
with groups (Bueno de Mesquita 2005a, Lapan and Sandler 1988, Zartman 2003) and state 
sponsorship (Bapat 2006, 2012; Byman 2005, 2008; Carter 2012a, 2015). Other relevant 
studies seek to understand consequence of counterterrorism policy (Enders and Sandler 
1993), such as leadership removal (Johnston 2012, Jordan 2014, Price 2012). If one looks 
through the dominant terrorism journals and top field journals, rigorous analyses of policy 
are not as common as they could be. As more data on counterterrorism policies becomes 
available (e.g., Dugan and Chenoweth, 2012; Gill, Piazza and Horgan 2016; Smith and 
Walsh 2013), hopefully we will see more such analysis of these policies.    
Another challenge in the literature is that empirical work does not engage 
sufficiently with the many important findings of the theoretical work on strategic 
interactions (Carter, 2012b). A few scholars, such as Bapat and Sandler, combine formal 
theory and empirical work, but this is relatively rare. Rigorously testing implications of 
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theoretical work on strategic interactions (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007) is an 
important avenue for future research.  
Perhaps the broadest challenge facing terrorism studies is insufficient dialogue with 
research on related topics. One example is civil war studies. Studies of terrorist group 
longevity can learn from and inform studies of civil war duration and termination. Studies 
of the causes of terrorism can learn from and inform studies of civil war onset. Studies of 
any organizational dynamic of terrorism can learn from and inform work on rebel groups in 
civil wars. Terrorism and civil war are distinct phenomena, but the overlaps suggest 
opportunities for enhanced research.  
Overall, scholars have made substantial progress toward understanding terrorism 
through examining organizational dynamics. As the research progresses, hopefully it can 
gain more conceptual clarity, contribute to important theoretical debates in terrorism studies 
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